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The purpose of this essay is to shed some light on a certain type of sentence,
which I call a borderline contradiction. A borderline contradiction is a sentence
of the form Fa ∧ ¬Fa, for some vague predicate F and some borderline case
a of F , or a sentence equivalent to such a sentence. For example, if Jackie
is a borderline case of ‘rich’, then ‘Jackie is rich and Jackie isn’t rich’ is a
borderline contradiction. Many theories of vague language have entailments
about borderline contradictions; correctly describing the behavior of borderline
contradictions is one of the many tasks facing anyone offering a theory of vague
language.
Here, I first briefly review claims made by various theorists about these
borderline contradictions, attempting to draw out some predictions about the
behavior of ordinary speakers. Second, I present an experiment intended to
gather relevant data about the behavior of ordinary speakers. Finally, I discuss
the experimental results in light of several different theories of vagueness, to
see what explanations are available. My conclusions are necessarily tentative;
I do not attempt to use the present experiment to demonstrate that any single
theory is incontrovertibly true. Rather, I try to sketch the auxiliary hypotheses
that would need to be conjoined to several extant theories of vague language to
predict the present result, and offer some considerations regarding the plausibil-
ity of these various hypotheses. In the end, I conclude that two of the theories
I consider are better-positioned to account for the observed data than are the
others. But the field of logically-informed research on people’s actual responses
to vague predicates is young; surely as more data come in we will learn a great
deal more about which (if any) of these theories best accounts for the behavior
of ordinary speakers.
1.1 Contradictions and borderline cases
In (Ripley, 2013), I defend a theory of vague language based on the paraconsis-
tent logic LP.1 LP can be thought of as a three-valued logic; it is dual to Strong
∗Published as (Ripley, 2011).
1LP is so christened in (Priest, 1979).
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Kleene logic, which has been recommended as a logic for vague language by eg
Soames (1998) and Tye (1994). If we use the numbers 1, .5 and 0 as the three
values, then we can assign each atomic sentence A a value ν(A), and calculate
the values of compound sentences as follows:
• ν(¬A) = 1− ν(A)
• ν(A ∧B) = min(ν(A), ν(B))
• ν(A ∨B) = max(ν(A), ν(B))
It follows from these clauses that when A takes value .5, so too will A ∧ ¬A.
But what do the values mean? We can, as usual, take the value 1 to represent
truth and 0 to represent falsity. When it comes to the value .5, LP and Strong
Kleene logic differ from each other. The Strong Kleene theorist reads .5 as a
gappy value—one taken by sentences that are neither true nor false. Since such
sentences aren’t true, they aren’t to be asserted, and they aren’t part of the
Strong Kleene theorist’s theory. On the other hand, the LP theorist reads .5
as a glutty value—one taken by sentences that are both true and false. Since
such sentences are true, they are to be asserted, and they are part of the LP
theorist’s theory.
An LP-based theory of vagueness uses this middle value for borderline cases.
That is, where Egbert is a borderline case of ‘old’, the sentence ‘Egbert is old’
receives value .5. As above, this ensures that the sentence ‘Egbert is old and
Egbert isn’t old’ also receives the value .5. Since sentences with the value .5
are true, this theory predicts borderline contradictions to be true (it predicts
them to be false as well). For similar reasons, whenever a is a borderline case
of a vague predicate F , I claim that ‘a is F and a is not F ’ is true. Similarly,
I claim that ‘a is neither F nor not F ’ is true as well, since this follows from
the former by a single De Morgan law plus an application of a double-negation
rule, both of which are valid in LP. This is a dialetheist theory, since it takes
some contradictions to be true.
Other theorists, of various stripes, have not been so sanguine about the truth
of borderline contradictions. A few quick examples: Fine (1975) dismisses the
idea in a single sentence—“Surely P ∧¬P is false even though P is indefinite”.2
Williamson’s (1994) much-discussed argument against denials of bivalence works
by arguing the denier to a contradiction; assuming the denial of bivalence was
initially made about a borderline case, this contradiction will itself be a border-
line contradiction. If Williamson thinks this is a dialectically strong argument,
as he gives every indication of, borderline contradictions had better not be true.
Keefe (2000) offers: “many philosophers would soon discount the paraconsis-
tent option (almost) regardless of how well it treats vagueness, on the grounds
of . . . the absurdity of p and ¬p both being true for many instances of p”. And
Shapiro (2006) claims, “That is, even if one can competently assert Bh and one
can competently assert its negation, one cannot competently contradict oneself
2Notation changed slightly; note that Fine is here treating borderline cases as “indefinite”.
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(dialetheism notwithstanding).”3 None of these rejections of borderline contra-
dictions offers much in the way of argument; it’s simply taken to be obvious that
borderline contradictions are never true, presumably since no contradictions are
ever true.4
Not all theorists—not even all non-dialetheist theorists—have been so quick
with borderline contradictions, though. For example, fuzzy theorists allow for
borderline contradictions to be partially (up to half) true.5 Let’s see how. The
usual way of doing things assigns each sentence A a real-number truth value ν(A)
from 0 to 1, inclusive. Then, the values of compound sentences are determined
truth-functionally from the values of their components, according to the same
clauses given above for LP. It follows from this that a contradiction (conjunction
of a sentence with its own negation) can take a value as high as .5. It takes this
maximum value when its conjuncts themselves each take value .5—right in the
middle of a vague predicate’s borderline. A fuzzy theorist interprets the value
.5 as a degree of partial truth, in particular as half truth, so a fuzzy theorist
predicts borderline contradictions to be at least partially true, as much as half
true. This prediction is often held up as a liability of fuzzy theories; see for
example (Williamson, 1994).
1.2 Predictions about ordinary speakers
Smith (2008, pp. 252–253) lists ten sorts of sentence for which we don’t as yet
have clear empirical data about speakers’ intuitions; he resists making many
predictions about speakers’ intuitions pending the data. At least three of his
categories are borderline contradictions, in my sense, and he’s right: there isn’t
much data on speakers’ responses to them.
Some experimenters have taken brief looks at ordinary speakers’ intuitions
surrounding vague predicates (for example Bonini et al. (1999)), but these have
primarily looked at atomic sentences, whereas the crucial action for theories of
borderline contradictions is clearly in compound sentences; empirical work here
is still in its infancy.6
Few logically-minded theorists of vagueness, then, have bothered being very
explicit about what their theories predict about ordinary speakers. This does
not mean, however, that there is no relation between these logical theories and
3Since, for Shapiro, the relevant cases in which one might competently assert Bh and
competently assert its negation are all cases where h is a borderline case of B, this is a
rejection of borderline contradictions.
4Williamson might claim to have an argument for his rejection of borderline contradictions:
his defense of classical logic on grounds of its simplicity. Note, though, that that defense is
dialectically out of line in the midst of the argument Williamson gives against denials of
bivalence; why bother arguing the bivalence-denier to a contradiction, and then appeal to the
truth of classical logic to reject the contradiction, when you could simply appeal to the truth
of classical logic directly to counter a denial of bivalence? Presumably, Williamson thinks the
rejection of borderline contradictions is dialectically more secure than his defense of the full
apparatus of classical logic.
5At least the usual sort of fuzzy theorists do. See for example (Smith, 2008).
6Since this paper was prepared, a few other studies have appeared that explore compound
sentences like those considered here: (Alxatib and Pelletier, 2011) and (Serchuk et al., 2011).
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experimental data. We have supervaluationist and contextualist and fuzzy the-
ories of vagueness, and we can take these theories to be formal semantic theo-
ries, answerable to speaker intuitions in just the same way that other semantic
theories—about gradable adjectives, or quantifier inferences, say—are.
It may well be, of course, that some theorists don’t intend for their logical
theories to be interpreted in this way. They might be offering hypotheses, for
example, about the structure of reality itself, independent of how we talk about
it; or they might be offering hypotheses about how we ought to use our language,
rather than about how we do. These are worthy questions in their own right,
but I won’t explore them here. Rather, I’ll present an experiment and weigh
various possible explanations for the result; as such, the goal here is to consider
various hypotheses about how speakers actually use vague language.
These hypotheses are best understood, I think, as theories of speakers’ lin-
guistic competence, and there is of course much more to participant responses
than simply their competence; any number of performance factors may inter-
vene. While there is no direct inference to be made from data about participants’
responses to conclusions about their competence, the two are still related. The
connection is provided by theories of the intervening performance factors. Given
data x, we can compare theories of competence y and z by seeing what theories
of performance would need to be conjoined to them, respectively, to explain x.
If we find that y needs an odd story about performance factors to explain x,
while z can explain x when conjoined with a natural (ideally, an independently-
motivated) theory of performance, then this gives us some reason to favor y over
z.
As we’ve seen above, different logical theories accord different status to bor-
derline contradictions—some predict them to be fully true, some predict them
to be at best half-true, and some predict them to never be true at all. I’ll present
and consider some evidence about which of these predictions seems to accord
best with speakers’ intuitions. Where predictions seem to come apart from par-
ticipants’ intuitions, I’ll consider various performance-based explanations that
might be offered.
2 The experiment
To explore intuitions about contradictions in borderline cases of vague predi-
cates, I conducted an experiment. Participants were 149 undergraduate students
at the University of North Carolina.7 They saw a slide (projected onto a screen)
with seven circle/square pairs on it, labeled ‘Pair A’ to ‘Pair G’. In Pair A, at
the very top of the slide, the circle was as far from the square as it could be,
while in Pair G, at the very bottom of the slide, the circle was touching the
square. In between, the remaining five pairs moved the circle bit-by-bit closer
to the square. (See Figure 1 on page 5.)
7No demographic information was collected. All students were within the first month of
introductory-level non-logic philosophy courses; it would be odd but possible for some of them









Figure 1: Experimental Stimulus
It’s difficult to tell exactly what’s a borderline case of ‘near the square’; as
many authors have pointed out, the extension of vague predicates like ‘near’ is
quite context-dependent, and it can be difficult to tell where the borderline is.
For example, if we’re discussing distances between cities, this provides a context
in which the circle is near the square in every pair; the distance in the farthest
pair is never more than the size of the screen being used, which is surely smaller
than the distance between even the closest cities. Nevertheless, I take it that
the context provided by this experiment is one in which: in Pair A, the circle
is a clear countercase of ‘near the square’ (that is, it is clearly not near the
square—after all, it’s as far away from the square as can be projected on the
screen), and in Pair G, the circle is a clear case of ‘near the square’. Somewhere
in between are the borderline cases.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions. In each con-
dition, participants were asked to indicate their amount of agreement with a
particular sentence as applied to each of the seven circle/square pairs. The four
conditions involved four different sentences; each participant, then, saw only
one sentence and rated it seven times, once for each pair. Ratings were on a
scale from 1 to 7, with 1 labeled ‘Disagree’ and 7 labeled ‘Agree’.8 The four
sentences were:
Conjunction, Non-elided: The circle is near the square and it isn’t near the
square.
8As will emerge in §3.4, offering participants a range of responses is crucial to evaluate how
well fuzzy theories describe participants’ responses.
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Conjunction, Elided: The circle both is and isn’t near the square.
Disjunction, Non-elided: The circle neither is near the square nor isn’t near
the square.
Disjunction, Elided: The circle neither is nor isn’t near the square.
I’ll discuss the difference between the elided and non-elided cases later. For
now, note that each of these sentences has the form of a contradiction. The
conjunctions wear their contradictoriness on their faces, while the disjunctions
are a bit disguised; but one application of a De Morgan law reveals them to be
contradictions as well.
2.1 Agreement to contradictions
The mean responses to each pair formed a hump pattern: higher in the middle
than at the ends. This is true overall, and it’s also true of each of the four
conditions (see Figure 2 on page 7). The highest overall mean occurred in
response to Pair C; there the mean response was 4.1, slightly above the midpoint
of the 1 to 7 scale. In other words, participants exhibit higher levels of agreement
to these apparent contradictions when they are about borderline cases; they do
not reject what appear to be borderline contradictions. They seem to make it
to at least ambivalence. In fact, they go considerably further. The means are as
low as they are because the participants do not agree amongst themselves as to
which stimulus should receive the highest response. If we forget about where the
highest responses occur, and look only at how high each participant’s highest
response is (see Figure 3 on page 7), we see that the modal maximum response
is 7—full agreement—and that the majority of participants offer a maximum
response of either 6 or 7.
Similar results are reported in (Alxatib and Pelletier, 2011); they do not
measure degree of agreement, but also record agreement with apparent contra-
dictions in borderline cases.
2.2 Response Types
Over 90% of participants gave responses that fall into one of four groups. I’ll
call these groups flat, hump, slope up, and slope down. Here are the defining
characteristics of these groups (see Figure 4 on page 8 for frequencies):
Flat: A flat response gives the same number for every question. (24 partici-
pants)
Hump: A hump response is not a flat response or a slope response, and it has
a peak somewhere between the first and last question; before the peak,
responses never go down from question to question (although they may go
up or remain the same), and after the peak, responses never go up from
question to question (although they may go down or stay the same). (76
participants)
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Figure 2: Mean responses


























Figure 3: Maximum responses
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Figure 4: Response type frequencies
Slope up: A slope up response is not a flat response, and it never goes down
from question to question (although it may go up or stay the same). (22
participants)
Slope down: A slope down response is not a flat response, and it never goes
up from question to question (although it may go down or stay the same).
(18 participants)
Other: There were a few responses that didn’t fit any of these patterns. (9
participants)
Flat responses, in particular flat 1s (14 participants), look like the sort of re-
sponse that would be predicted by all those theorists who hold that no contra-
diction is ever true, even a bit, even in borderline cases. But the majority of
responses (76/149 participants) were hump responses.
The discussion that follows in §3 will consider various explanations for par-
ticipants’ agreement, partial or full, with these sentences. I’ll focus discussion
on the relatively large number of hump responses; a fuller discussion would
consider potential explanations for the flat and slope groups as well.9
9Question type (conjunction vs. disjunction) had a significant effect on response type
(χ2(4, N = 149) = 11.27, p < .05). However, this effect disappeared when the two slope
response types were lumped together (χ2(3, N = 149) = 2.76, p = .43). Slope up responses
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3 Interpretations
It seems at first blush that we have substantial numbers of participants agreeing,
at least somewhat, with borderline contradictions of various sorts. As in §1.1,
however, theorists of varying stripes have not only claimed, but taken it to be
obvious, that borderline contradictions can never be true. If those theorists are
right, then participants in the present study either 1) were not really agreeing
with contradictions, but rather with something else, or 2) were really agreeing
with contradictions, but were mistaken in doing so. In this section, I’ll consider
a variety of potential explanations along these lines for the observed results.
I’ll also consider potential explanations of a third sort: those that hold that
participant were really agreeing with contradictions, and that they agre because
those contradictions are (partially or wholly) true. In the end, I’ll argue that
two potential explanations—one of the first type and one of the third type—are
better positioned to explain the data than are the others.
3.1 Contextual factors
This explanation falls into the “not really a contradiction” category.
Here’s one way to explain the relatively high levels of assent to sentences
like ‘The circle is near the square and it isn’t near the square’ and ‘The circle
neither is near the square nor isn’t near the square’: participants take the phrase
‘near the square’ to have subtly different extensions in each of its two occurrences
within the sentence. If this is so, their assent to these sentences can be explained
without supposing that any participants agree to a contradiction. (For my
purposes here, a “contextualist” is not someone who offers any particular theory
of vagueness, but rather anyone who thinks that the hump responses in the
present experiment are to explained by appealing to contextual shift in the
extension of ‘near the square’.)
Such a contextualist theory can come in one of two flavors: it might hold
that ‘near the square’ has these different extensions because it has different
contents in each of its uses, or it might hold that ‘near the square’ has the
same content in each of its uses, but that nonetheless it has different extensions
in different contexts. Following (MacFarlane, 2009), I’ll call the first flavor
‘indexical contextualism’ and the second ‘nonindexical contextualism’. I discuss
each in turn.10
occurred more in response to conjunctions, and slope down responses in response to disjunc-
tions. This makes it seem as though the slope responders tended to ignore the second conjunct
in each case, treating ‘both near and not’ as ‘near’ and ‘neither near nor not’ as ‘not near’.
More study would be needed to definitively interpret the slope responses.
10Besides the difference between indexical and nonindexical contextualism, there is another
difference in the area: the difference between theories that posit sensitivity to context-of-use
(sometimes called “contextualist”) and theories that posit sensitivity to context-of-assessment
(sometimes called “relativist”). I’ll ignore that distinction; for my purposes here, I’m happy
to lump the relativists in with the contextualists.
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3.1.1 Indexical contextualism
Indexical contextualism about vague terms is defended in (Soames, 2002). On
this theory, different uses of vague terms can express different properties. This
shiftiness is understood as the very same shiftiness exhibited by such indexi-
cal expressions as ‘here’, ‘now’, ‘you’, ‘tomorrow’, &c. For example, let’s focus
on ‘you’. ‘You’, let’s suppose, picks out a certain person: the person being
addressed when it’s uttered. Now, imagine someone uttering the following sen-
tence: ‘Mona sees you, and Louie sees you’. It should be clear that the two
occurrences of ‘you’ in such an utterance might pick out different people; just
imagine the context changing in the right way (that is, so that the first half of
the sentence is addressed to someone different than the second half).
On an indexical contextualist theory, something just like this might be hap-
pening in the sentence ‘The circle is near the square and not near the square’;
the first occurrence of ‘near the square’ can pick out one property, and the
second some other property. For this to be the case there would have to be
some relevant shift in context between the two occurrences, and the indexical
contextualist would have to provide some story about what the relevant context
is and why it shifts.11 Even with such a story in hand, though, the indexical
contextualist runs into some difficulties with the experimental data.
The difficulty arises with the elided sentences: ‘The circle both is and isn’t
near the square’ and ‘The circle neither is nor isn’t near the square’. Each of
these sentences contains only one occurrence of ‘near the square’. It’s clear,
though, that indexicals, in these circumstances, can have only a single interpre-
tation. Compare our earlier ‘Mona sees you, and Louie sees you’ to ‘Mona sees
you, and Louie does too’. Even with the same shift in context (that is, with the
second half of the sentence addressed to someone different than the first half),
the second sentence must report that Mona and Louie see the very same person.
Since there’s only one occurrence of ‘you’, it can only pick out one person.12
Thus, the indexical contextualist should predict that, although participants
might agree to the non-elided sentences, they should not agree to the elided
sentences, since the mechanism invoked to explain participants’ agreement in
11This requirement is not unique to the indexical contextualist; every contextualist needs
such a story. I won’t be concerned with the details of such stories here—see for example
(Raffman, 1996), (Shapiro, 2006), or (Soames, 1998). (NB: Raffman and Shapiro are not
indexical contextualists.)
12Similar phenomena arise around (at least) demonstratives, definite descriptions, and
proper names. In each of the following pairs, the first member allows a shift where the
second does not:
• ∗ Mary’s buying that, unless Murray buys that
∗ Mary’s buying that, unless Murray does
• ∗ Put your bag on the table, and your books on the table
∗ Put your bag on the table, and your books too
• ∗ Esmerelda went to the store, and Esmerelda bought some fish
∗ Esmerelda went to the store and bought some fish
10
the non-elided cases can’t operate in the elided cases. Participants simply should
not agree with elided sentences. At the very least, they should agree less than
they do with the non-elided sentences. This prediction is not borne out. If we
consider each participants’ maximum level of agreement, there is no significant
difference between responses to elided and non-elided sentences.13 Nor is there
a difference in response types (flat, hump, &c.) between elided and non-elided
cases.14 If participants’ agreement to these apparent contradictions, then, is to
be explained by appealing to context, that context can’t be operating in the
way that context operates on indexicals.15
3.1.2 Nonindexical contextualism
Is there another way, then, for context to come into play? The nonindexical
contextualist thinks so. I think nonindexical contextualism, suitably filled in,
provides one of the more plausible explanations for the results of the present
study. The task of this section will be to present some constraints that the
nonindexical contextualist must satisfy to explain the observed results.
To see how nonindexical contextualism works, let’s consider an indexical case
in more detail. Consider an utterance, by me, of the sentence ‘I like to dance’.
The occurrence of ‘I’ in that utterance refers to me, so the whole utterance has
the content Dave likes to dance.16 That content is (very) true, but it might
have been false; it is true with regard to the world we find ourselves in, and
false with regard to other possible worlds. So, in determining the extension
(truth-value) of the utterance from its content, we need to take something more
into account: we must consider at least which possible world we’re in. The
nonindexical contextualist finds a role for context in just this way—in the step
from content to extension. They can offer various theories, still, about which
contextual factors come into play; the key to nonindexical contextualism is when
those factors do their work.17 For the details of one particular nonindexical
contextualist theory of vague predicates, see (Fara, 2000); for general arguments
that contextualists about vagueness should be nonindexical contextualists, see
(A˚kerman and Greenough, 2010).
So what would a nonindexical contextualist offer as a take on the present
study? Let’s start with ‘The circle is near the square and it isn’t near the square’.
The indexical contextualist held that this sentence ascribes one property (‘near
the square’ in context 1) and the negation of some other property (‘near the
square’ in context 2) to the circle; its content was thus baldly noncontradictory.
But the nonindexical contextualist doesn’t go this route; she’ll say that the
sentence ascribes one property (nearness-to-the-square) and the negation of that
very property to the circle. In order to avoid contradiction, then, she must say
13As measured by a one-way ANOVA, F (1, 148) = .24, p = .62.
14χ2(4, N = 149) = 1.98, p = .74.
15This is similar to the argument in (Stanley, 2003), except that Stanley fails to distinguish
between indexical and nonindexical contextualism. See (A˚kerman and Greenough, 2010) for
details.
16I ignore any possible context-sensitivity, of any sort, in ‘likes to dance’.
17This way of framing the issue owes much to (Kaplan, 1989) and (MacFarlane, 2009).
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that the one property has two different extensions with regard to two different
contexts. Importantly, those contexts must both be at play in the interpretation
of the single sentence.18 If context is ephemeral, dependent on, say, a transient
mental state of the judger (as in (Raffman, 1996)), then this should be possible.
On the other hand, if context is coarser-grained, dependent on only things like
world, approximate time, location, speaker, and the like, then we can see that
context could not have changed mid-sentence, and so a contextualist explanation
couldn’t get off the ground.
By examining the elided conditions in the present study, we can see further
constraints on a workable nonindexical contextualist theory. We’ve already seen
that, for this explanation to work, the relevant features of the context in play
must be relatively fine-grained. The elided conditions provide us evidence about
which context it is that comes into play. Consider ‘The circle both is and isn’t
near the square’. For a nonindexical contextualist explanation to work, the
context relevant to determining the extension of ‘near the square’ cannot be the
context in which ‘near the square’ is read by the participant. After all, there
is only one such context, but the contextualist appeals crucially to a change in
context between two extension-determinations.
I see two options for the nonindexical contextualist: 1) it may be that par-
ticipants process this sentence into some form that contains two occurrences of
‘near the square’ or something (conceptual material, presumably) correspond-
ing to ‘near the square’—then each separate occurrence can be affected by the
context in which it occurs—or 2) it may be that participants evaluate the con-
juncts one at a time, retaining only the truth-value of each conjunct after its
evaluation—then each evaluation can be affected by the context in which it oc-
curs. Neither of these explanations is straightforwardly available to an indexical
contextualist, lest she (falsely) predict that sentences like ‘Mona sees you, and
Louie does too’ can exhibit the same kind of shift. The nonindexical contex-
tualist, though, can avoid this prediction, by supposing that the duplication or
repetition process operates on contents rather than characters or expressions.
Thus, nonindexical contextualism, suitably filled in as above, can offer an
explanation of the present results. Below, I’ll consider other possible explana-
tions.
3.2 Noncompositional theories
Another variety of not-really-a-contradiction explanation claims that the sen-
tences in question are not compositionally interpreted; that ‘The circle is near
18At least for indexical context-sensitivity (and why should nonindexical sensitivity differ?),
it seems incontrovertible that multiple contexts can be involved in the interpretation of a single
sentence. See note 12, or consider ‘I am here now’, which can be false if said very slowly while
moving very quickly. Some authors, though, have missed this: for example Richard (1993),
who writes, ‘Switching contexts in the middle of interpreting a sentence is clearly contrary to
the spirit, not to speak of the letter, of Kaplan’s approach to indexicals.’ (I’m skeptical of
his reading of Kaplan.) Other authors have played it down: see (Kaplan, 1989), which makes
‘I am here now’ come out as a logical truth in its logic of indexicals, or (MacFarlane, 2009),
which talks of context affecting whole propositions at once.
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the square and it isn’t near the square’ directly expresses something like what’s
expressed by ‘The circle is a borderline case of “near the square”’. Perhaps
it’s an idiom, or something like an idiom. Then participants’ relatively high
level of agreement could be explained without supposing that they agree to a
contradiction.
The problem with such an account is that it’s difficult to see why apparent
contradictions would express borderline-case-ness. How would such an idiom
get off the ground? Presumably because some other explanation canvassed here
(in particular, one of the explanations in §§3.1, 3.4, or 3.5) was at one time
correct; then language learners, for whatever reason, might have mistaken their
elders’ compositional utterances for direct claims of borderline-case-ness. This
fills in the story, but it does so compositionally. Without some explanation very
unlike this (lightning strike?), I don’t see that a noncompositional theory can
avoid essentially appealing to some compositional theory, and it seems that it
will then take on the pros and cons of whatever compositional theory it chooses.
There will be a few extra cons, however. A non-compositional theory must
explain why there is no significant difference in the frequency of observed hump
responses between the four experimental conditions, and why there is no signif-
icant difference between the maximum responses given by participants in these
conditions.19 Do we have four closely-related idioms? If so, why? In addition,
this strategy invokes an additional step: learners coming to acquire noncompo-
sitional uses of these once-compositionally-used expressions. Without further
evidence, a noncompositional theory introduces needless complication; better
to stick with a compositional story.
3.3 Error theories
So much for explanations that work on the hypothesis that what participants are
agreeing to isn’t a contradiction. Among theories that concede that participants
are agreeing to a contradiction, error theories of various sorts are available.
An error theorist holds that, while participants are in fact agreeing to real
contradictions, they are wrong to do so—these contradictions are simply false.
Those who hold a supervaluationist or epistemicist theory of vague predicates
might most naturally explain the present results via an error theory.
An error theory might work something like those presented in (Eklund, 2005)
and (Sorensen, 2001), according to which all competent speakers have disposi-
tions to accept certain falsehoods involving vague predicates, or it might work
in a more informal way, supposing participants to simply be mistaken, not in
virtue of being competent speakers, but just in virtue of being confused, or not
paying attention, or being misled by the experiment, or failing to report what
they actually believe, or some such.
19See notes 9, 13, and 14; and note that there was also no significant difference between
maximum responses to conjunctive and disjunctive sentences (F (1, 148) = .53, p = .47), nor
any interaction effect on maximum responses between conjunction/disjunction and elided/non-
elided (as measured by a two-way ANOVA, F (1, 148) = 1.37, p = .25).
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3.3.1 Competence-based error theories
I’ll turn now to the former sort of error theory. Eklund’s view can directly
explain why participants would make errors in these cases; it’s part of his the-
ory that competent speakers have a disposition to make errors in the use of
vague predicates. But the errors he takes speakers to be disposed to make are
not hump-style responses. Rather, he supposes that competent speakers are dis-
posed to believe tolerance principles around their vague predicates. He takes his
tolerance principle from (Wright, 1975); for a vague predicate F , the tolerance
principle reads:
• Whereas large enough differences in F ’s parameter of application some-
times matter to the justice with which it is applied, some small enough
difference never thus matters.20
But belief in a principle like this would not lead participants to give hump-style
responses; rather, if it applied at all, it would lead participants to give flat
responses, responses not affected by the small differences in the cases they were
shown. So while Eklund predicts that participants will make a certain sort of
error, he does not predict the hump-style responses given by many participants.
Sorensen (2001) faces a similar problem: although he claims that compe-
tent speakers will believe contradictions involving vague predicates, he does not
predict the present results. The “contradictions” Sorensen predicts speakers to
believe are sentences of the form ‘If a is F , then a’s successor is F too’, where
a and its successor are consecutive members of a sorites sequence for F . Since
Sorensen is an epistemicist, he thinks there is some sharp cutoff between the F s
and the non-F s; when a and its successor straddle this sharp cutoff, he believes
this conditional to be analytically false. Nonetheless, he thinks, we believe it.
This is essentially the same as Eklund’s view, except for the decision to
call these tolerance conditionals “contradictions”. This sort of view, if it can
be made to make any predictions at all about the present study, predicts flat
responses, not hump responses. So again, this style of view cannot explain the
present results.
I suppose someone might hold a view like this: being a competent speaker
requires us to believe contradictions like ‘a both is and isn’t F ’ when a is a bor-
derline case of F , but nevertheless such contradictions are always false. That
view of course would predict the hump responses obtained in the present study.
But why would competent speakers believe those falsehoods and not others?
Any view of this sort would need to answer that question. Sorensen and Ek-
lund go to great lengths to motivate their claims that speakers believe certain
falsehoods; an error theorist of this type would need some story to fill a corre-
sponding role. I know of no error theorist who holds this kind of theory, and so
I know of no error theorist who’s attempted to provide such a story.
20F ’s parameter of application is the dimension along which something can vary to make it
more or less F ; so ‘tall”s parameter of application is height, ‘bald”s is amount and arrangement
of hair, &c.
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3.3.2 Other error theories
I turn now to the other sort of error theory. This sort takes the participants
who agreed with some contradiction to be mistaken for some reason other than
their linguistic competence. So stated, there is a gap: on its own, this offers us
no explanation for why participants would make these errors and not others. It
could of course be supplemented with some theory about the conditions under
which people are likely to make certain errors, and then that supplemental
theory could be dealt with on its own merits.21
Two such supplemental theories are offered by an anonymous referee. First,
it’s possible that, although participants would naturally want to simply reject
all the sentences, the mere fact of being asked about the same sentence again
and again suggests that something else is wanted of them. This might lead
participants to vary their responses. Indeed, it’s likely that asking participants
about the same sentence repeatedly leads at least some of them to vary their
responses, to avoid being uncooperative. As the referee points out, though, this
stops well short of explaining why participants would vary their responses in
such a coordinated way; it would predict (correctly) few flat responses, but it
would fail to predict the hump responses that predominated.22
Second, it’s possible that being asked about their agreement or disagreement
with the sentences, rather than the sentences’ truth or falsity, suggested to the
subjects that the issue at hand is a matter of personal opinion, causing them
to respond to some proposition ‘about which opinions could differ’, rather than
responding to the target sentence. I am skeptical about this hypothesis, for
two reasons. The first reason is that it’s not clear what this other proposition
might be. In order to explain the present results, the proposition must meet two
constraints: 1) it must be a plausible interpretation of the test sentences, and
2) it must be more likely to be agreed with in borderline cases. I don’t know
what might meet these constraints. The second reason is that agreement and
disagreement are not restricted only or even primarily to matters of opinion.
We quite often agree and disagree with statements of fact. As such, I doubt
that asking about agreement and disagreement suggests to participants that the
question is opinion-based, although there is certainly room to explore this issue
further.
There may be other available hypotheses as to why participants would err
in the task at hand in this experiment; each would have to be considered on its
own merits.
21NB: It can’t simply be that participants err randomly under certain conditions; there are
very many possible response patterns that simply didn’t occur, or that occurred very rarely,
while the hump pattern occurred in the majority of responses.
22A partial explanation for the relatively large number of slope responses might be lurking
around here; given that participants were presented with seven smoothly-shifting pairs and
asked to judge each sentence from one to seven (a coincidental double use of seven), that
may have suggested to some that a smooth shift in their responses from one to seven or from
seven to one was called for. This, of course, is to gesture towards an error theory of the slope
responses; but I don’t see how the slope responses can be accounted for without an error




A fuzzy theory can both 1) allow that participants interpreted the sentences in
question as contradictions, and 2) allow that participants might not be mistaken
in partial assent to such sentences. This second feature is a virtue for a few
reasons. First, as we’ve seen in §3.3, no existing error theory predicts speakers
to be mistaken in this way; and second, it seems a bit odd to suppose that
speakers are mistaken about what’s near what, when they can see the relevant
objects clearly, are deceived in no way about the distance between them, and are
not under any time pressure to come to a judgment. A fuzzy theory can allow
for non-mistaken (partial) assent to contradictions because on a fuzzy theory
contradictions can be partially true, as we saw in §1.1.
At first blush, then, it appear that the fuzzy theorist has the resources to
account for the responses observed. This appearance is strengthened if we look
at the mean responses for each question (see Figure 2 on page 7): the clear cases
on each end result in mean responses just above 2—very low in agreement—and
the mean responses rise gradually as one approaches pair C, where the mean
response is just barely above 4, the midpoint in the agreement scale. These data
are very much in line with what a fuzzy theorist would most likely predict.
Appearances, though, can be deceiving. Although the mean responses to
each question create a pattern congenial to the fuzzy theorist, they do so for
a strikingly non-fuzzy reason. This can be brought out by considering the
difference between the maximum of the mean responses (4.1) and the mean of
the maximum responses (5.3). The majority of responses were hump responses,
but not all humps reach their peak in response to pair C, presumably due
to slight disagreements between participants on which pairs were the clearest
borderline cases. Recall Figure 3 on page 7.
If the fuzzy theorist’s formalism maps directly on to participants’ responses,
we would expect participants’ responses to these contradictions to peak some-
where around 4, the midpoint. After all, none of these sentences can ever be
more than .5 true, on a fuzzy theory. But this is not what happens. As re-
ported above, more participants peak at 7—full agreement—than at any other
response.23 The mean of the maximum responses is 5.3—significantly above
4.24
The fuzzy theorist, faced with these data, should conclude that the fuzzy
formalism does not map directly onto participants’ responses, then. Here’s a
hypothesis she might offer: perhaps responses as high as 7—full agreement—
can still indicate the speech act of .5-assertion. If this is so, then the fuzzy
theorist can simply claim that participants who gave very high responses to
these sentences were still only .5-asserting them.
I don’t see that this hypothesis is untenable, but it would take some filling
23Actually, more than twice as many peak at 7 than at any other response, and over half of
participants peak at either 6 or 7.
24In fact, this is so for each of the four conditions: for conjunction, non-elided, mean
5.2, t(43) = 3.96, p < .001; for conjunction, elided, mean 5.3, t(39) = 4.719, p < .001; for
disjunction, non-elided, mean 5.7, t(28) = 5.67, p < .001; for disjunction, elided, mean 5.1,
t(35) = 2.81, p < .01.
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in. Presumably a response of 7 can also indicate 1-assertion (full assertion),
so this hypothesis leads the fuzzy theorist to suppose that a 7-point scale from
‘Disagree’ to ‘Agree’ is not sensitive to the different degrees of assertion partic-
ipants might wish to make. But if not this sort of scale, then what would be
sensitive to those degrees? It seems that the fuzzy theorist appealing to this
hypothesis would need to address that question. With an answer to that ques-
tion in hand, a study like the present one could be conducted, to see whether
participants really do indicate .5-assertion to these sentences.
Alternatively, the fuzzy theorist could offer an error theory of some sort.
She might allow that although the highest level of assertion appropriate to these
sentences is .5, most participants in fact evinced a higher level of assertion, and
simply claim that these participants are mistaken. As we’ve seen, such responses
are unilluminating unless conjoined with some explanation of why participants
would make these mistakes in these circumstances; but there is no reason why
a fuzzy theorist couldn’t propose such an explanation.
3.5 Dialetheisms
A dialetheic theory like that presented in (Ripley, 2013) shares some of the
features of a fuzzy explanation for the present data: it can allow that, in line
with appearances, participants are responding to genuine contradictions; and
it can allow that these participants are not mistaken. What’s more, since a
dialetheic theory predicts that the contradictions that occurred in this study
are (fully) true, it naturally predicts levels of assent higher than the midpoint
values most naturally predicted by fuzzy theorists.
This is because, according to this variety of dialetheic theory, the borderline
contradictions in the present study are true.25 The circle really is both near the
square and not near the square, when it’s a borderline case of ‘near the square’.
And similarly, it’s neither near the square nor not near the square, in the same
circumstances. Since participants in the present study were well-positioned to
see this, and since they are competent with ‘near the square’, conjunction, dis-
junction, and negation, they agreed with the borderline contradictions because
they recognized them as true.
A dialetheic explanation, then, faces a quite different puzzle from the other
theories we’ve seen. The question a dialetheist must answer is not ‘Why so
much assent?’ but ‘Why so little?’. As we’ve seen, the mean of the maximum
responses was 5.3. Even allowing for ceiling effects, this is unlikely to represent
full agreement. But if participants were well-situated to recognize the truth, and
the truth is contradictory, why would they not simply fully agree to borderline
contradictions? A dialetheist owes some answer here.
Since I defend a dialetheic theory of vagueness elsewhere, I’ll offer a sketch
of one possible answer. It’s been alleged among cross-cultural psychologists that
people from East Asian cultures are more open to contradictions than are people
25It thus differs from the dialetheic theory proposed in (Hyde, 1997), which holds borderline
contradictions to always be false. A Hyde-style dialetheist would presumably resort to an error
theory of some variety to explain the present results.
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from Western cultures. These allegations, though, have often used a very wide
sense of ‘contradiction’, much wider than that used here. For example, Peng
and Nisbett (1999) count all of the following as “tolerating contradictions”:
• Preferring compromise to adversarial dispute resolution
• Preferring proverbs like ‘too humble is half proud’ to proverbs like ‘one
against all is certain to fall’
• Reconciling ‘most long-lived people eat fish or chicken’ with ‘it’s more
healthy to be a strict vegetarian’
Clearly, their sense of ‘contradiction’ is not the sense in play here; so while they
may have found a very real cultural difference, their data do not show anything
about cultural acceptance of contradictions, in our sense.
In an attempt to connect this cross-cultural research more directly to the
philosopher’s idea of contradiction, Huss and Yingli (2007) ran a cross-cultural
study that asked participants in Canada and China for their responses to more
paradigm contradictions: the liar paradox, a reductio argument, and most im-
portantly for my purposes here, a borderline contradiction. In particular, they
presented their participants with a vignette describing a borderline case of ‘rain-
ing’, and asked about the sentence ‘It’s raining and it’s not raining’.
Despite the narrower focus, the results they found were broadly in line with
Peng and Nisbett’s research: Huss and Yingli’s Chinese participants were much
more willing to agree with the contradictions they saw than were their Canadian
counterparts. This suggests that cultural differences matter for agreement with
contradictions, in particular borderline contradictions. One possibility is that
Westerners hold a cultural norm against agreeing with contradictions.26
Suppose this to be true. Then, despite their linguistic competence pushing
them to accept the borderline contradictions, subjects in the present experiment
(as well as Canadian subjects in Huss and Yingli’s study) may well have had
their assent reduced by cultural norms. The effect would be much the same if
we were to ask participants for their grammatical (rather than semantic) intu-
itions about sentences like ‘Which table did you leave the book on?’; although
ending a sentence with a preposition is perfectly grammatical in English, the
cultural norm against it may well drive participants to reduce their judgments
of grammaticality.27
If it is true that Westerners have a cultural aversion to contradictions in
general, we should expect the levels of assent given by university students in
North Carolina to be somewhat lower than what would be generated purely by
their linguistic competence; once we take this into account, the dialetheist has
a straightforward explanation for the middling levels of assent. So it seems that
the dialetheist has a plausible explanation for the observed results as well.
26Note that if contextualism of the sort described in §3.1 is right, Huss and Yingli’s sentence
was presumably not really interpreted as a contradiction either, at least by those who agreed
with it. A contextualist should then probably say that Canadians are more likely to give such
a sentence a contradictory reading than Chinese.
27See (Labov, 1996) for examples of this sort of response.
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As an anonymous referee points out, one could also suppose that East Asians
hold a cultural norm pushing in favor of contradictions; or that both Westerners
and East Asians hold cultural norms pushing in favor of contradictions, but
that the East Asian norm is stronger. Either of these hypotheses gibes with the
cross-cultural results, but would not support the dialetheist interpretation of
the present study. They might support a fuzzy interpretation or even a purely
classical interpretation. Unfortunately, despite the wealth of data on cross-
cultural psychology, not much is yet known about how cultural norms relate to
contradictions in the sense that’s relevant here. More research is called for, to
get clearer on what cultural differences exist and how they are arrived at.
4 Conclusions
When it comes to (apparent) borderline contradictions, then, it seems that the
nonindexical contextualist and the dialetheist offer the two most plausible ex-
planations of the observed results. Before I close, I want to draw some attention
to the similarities between these views that allow them to succeed where other
views do not. I also want to draw attention to just how hard it will be to design
an experiment that could distinguish between these theories.
Note that the nonindexical contextualist, to plausibly explain the results
of this study, needed to invoke a relatively fine-grained notion of context. In
particular, it seems that context must be able to change for a participant who
sees nothing different and doesn’t move. Context must thus be at least difficult
to observe. Now, the nonindexical contextualist I’ve envisioned sticks to classical
logic at the level of extensions. But since it’s very difficult to tell when we’ve
changed context, this means that the logic of properties we’ll use to generate
experimental predictions will blur across contexts. And when you blur classical
logic in this way, the result is the paraconsistent logic LP. (See (Lewis, 1982)
and (Brown, 1999) for details and discussion.)
On the other hand, the dialetheist view I defend in (Ripley, 2013) holds LP
to be the correct logic of vagueness even in a single context.28 Thus, it could
be quite tricky to find an experimental wedge between the two views. The key
to such a wedge would come from some operationalization of the notoriously
slippery term ‘context’. The contextualist and the dialetheist make different
predictions about what will happen in a single context. I leave this issue for
future work.29
28NB: the dialetheist is under no obligation to use a fine-grained context, although she
might find reason to.
29This paper has been drastically helped by discussions with Mark Colyvan, Paul Egre´,
Patrick Greenough, Graham Priest, Diana Raffman, Greg Restall, Robert van Rooij, Nick
Smith, audiences at the Philosophy and Psychology of Vagueness Workshop and the 2009
Amsterdam Graduate Philosophy Conference and especially Joshua Knobe. This research
was partially supported by the Agence Nationale de la Recherche, Project “Cognitive Origins
of Vagueness”, grant ANR-07-JCJC0070.
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